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The ethics of biobanking: assessing the right to control problem for broad consent 
 
1. INTRODUCTION: THE BIOBANK CONSENT DEBATE AND THE “RIGHT TO CONTROL”  
 
Over the past two decades, there has been a great deal of debate about the proper ethical legal and 
regulatory framework for biobanks.1 This debate arises against the backdrop of a broader ethical, 
legal and regulatory framework for medical research, a framework that has informed consent as a 
central requirement. Researchers are required to accompany requests for participation in their 
research with a disclosure of information about the nature and purpose of the research, the identity 
of the researcher, and any anticipated burdens, costs or risks for the participant. But in biobank 
research, at the point of acquisition of the biological sample from a "donor" the nature and purpose 
of future research, the risks and burdens of that research, and the identity of future researchers, are 
not yet known.  One response here is that in order to meet these standards biobanks ought to make 
indefinitely many project-specific consent requests for each and every (relevantly different) research 
use of (non-anonymised) samples and data.2  But the value of biobanks stems from the fact that 
they store, organise, and make readily available, very large sets of samples and information for many 
different researchers, on many different occasions, over a long, open-ended, time scale.  Given the 
scale, heterogeneity, and long-term nature, of biobank research gaining project-specific consent is 
apt to be costly, administratively burdensome, and problematic. As time passes the process of re-
contacting donors may itself be problematic, as people move home.  Participants may not wish to be 
subjected to repeated requests for consent.  There is also the risk that repeated instances of re-
consent lead to a mere appearance or "ritual" of consent as it becomes “routinized”.3  
It has been argued that biobanks can be plausibly interpreted as adhering to informed consent 
standards without repeated instances of project-specific informed consent.  This can be achieved by 
a one off consent transaction at the point of acquisition, one that makes known relevant facts about 
the types of researcher and research uses, the likely types of risks and burdens that participation or 
donation entails.4  In defence of this broad consent framework, it is stressed that all informed 
                                                          
1 For a useful summary of biobank ethical and regulatory debate see K. Hoeyer. The ethics of 
research biobanking: a critical review of the literature. Biotechnol Genet Eng Rev 2008; 25: 429-452..  
See also T. Caulfield & B.M. Knoppers. Consent, privacy and research biobanks. GPS Policy Brief 
2010; 1:10. 
2 Also called “study specific” or “case by case” consent.  C.M. Simon, et al. Active choice but not too 
active: public perspectives on biobank consent models. Genetics in Medicine 2011; 13: 821-831.   
3 T. Ploug & S. Holm. Informed consent and routinisation. J Med Ethics 2013; 39:214-218. 
4 See M.G. Hansson et al. Should donors be allowed to give broad consent to future biobank 
research? Lancet oncol 2006; 7: 266-269; K.S. Steinsbekk, B.K Myskja & B. Solberg. Broad consent 
 
 
consent involves a specification of types of action, rather than an indefinitely fine-tuned 
specification of every single action that might be done.  The same point applies for the identity of 
the researchers.  Informed consent to participate in non-biobank research is typically not directed at 
a named, unique, individual.  It is given to institutions, or units within an institution, (if a researcher 
leaves and a new one is employed, presumably even the most stringent project-specific informed 
consent advocate would not insist upon the ethical need for repeated consent).  Once we accept the 
logical point that all consent is to types of action, and that research consent is to types of people 
occupying certain roles, there is no conceptual barrier to broad consent constituting informed 
consent.  Broad consent frameworks need not be viewed as simply a matter of the participant being 
asked to give blanket consent to any or every possible use, without constraint or limitation.  Broad 
consent involves consent to a specified, and restricted, set of actions, by a specified, and restricted, 
set of agents.5  Certain types of researcher and research use can be identified and disclosed.  
Additional elements of protection for participants can be provided by further institutional bodies, 
with specified roles in assessing research proposals, monitoring and evaluating researchers and their 
practice.  
As we have outlined it so far, the biobank consent debate is an interpretative matter: can broad 
consent be properly interpreted as a species of informed consent?  This interpretative debate 
quickly reaches an impasse, with different intuitions about what constitutes informed consent.  
There is a different kind of argument against broad consent, one that does not rest upon our 
intuitions about whether broad consent constitutes informed consent.  More specifically, broad 
consent frameworks—however we label them—do not afford the same kind and degree of control 
over the use of samples and data that project-specific consent frameworks do.  The evidence 
suggests that biobank participants have a preference for such control.  Thus Goodson and Vernon’s 
survey of participant attitudes suggests that 'a relatively large number of individuals would want 
some ongoing control over their tissue after donation.'6  Similarly, Simon et al. surveying biobank 
participants’ attitudes note that ‘Although their perspectives on broad consent were generally very 
favorable, participants did express some concerns over the model. They recognized that biobank 
participants would have little choice or control over the kind of research their samples would be 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
versus dynamic consent in biobank research: Is passive participation an ethical problem? Eur J Med 
Genet 2013; 21: 897-902. 
5 Indeed, it is interesting to speculate whether intuitions would have been different were it labelled 
restricted consent (in contrast to “blanket” consent). 
6 M.L. Goodson & B.G. Vernon. A Study of Public Opinion on the Use of Tissue Samples from Living 
Subjects for Clinical Research. Journal of Clinical Pathology 2004; 57: 135-138. 
 
 
used in.’7 Steinsbekk, et al, defending broad consent, note the importance of control as a 
consideration against broad consent ‘Providing individual biobank contributors with tools that give 
them increased control and maybe new rights over their contribution is probably the strongest 
argument for a dynamic interactive consent model.8   
 
Now, by itself, a preference for control over samples and data, or a “concern” over the possible lack 
of control, does not constitute a conclusive objection against broad consent.  Participants may want, 
or prefer, all sorts of things.  Participants might prefer that their participation were paid for, or that 
they received a brand new laptop by way of thanks.  It does not follow from this that the biobank 
ought to provide such things.  However, there is a stronger line of argument in this area, one that 
has received less attention, but which, if defensible, would constitute a good moral case against 
broad consent frameworks.  This is the idea that participants have a moral right to retain and 
exercise ongoing control over access to and use of their samples and data. Thus Caulfield et al 
suggest that broad consent frameworks ‘do not allow patients to act meaningfully on their 
continuing right to control their health information’ (emphasis added).9 Elsewhere Caulfield expands 
on this line of thought, suggesting a strong connection between autonomy and a right to control: 
 
In the realm of biobanks, autonomy is largely about the maintenance of control over something that 
implicates personal integrity. It implies that the research participant should retain a right of control 
over their genetic and personal information. This is, to some degree, about respecting fundamental 
human rights.10 
 
Caulfield makes appeal to "biorights" which include "the idea that research participants have an 
ongoing right to control their research samples"11   
                                                          
7 C.M. Simon, et al. Active choice but not too active: public perspectives on biobank consent models. 
Genetics in Medicine 2011; 13: 821-83, p. 826. 
8 Steinsbekk, Myskja & Solberg, op. cit. p. 899. 
9 T. Caulfield, R.E.G. Upshur & A. Daar. DNA databanks and consent: a suggested policy option 
involving an authorization model. BMC Med Ethics 2003; 4: 1-4, p. 4,  
10 T. Caulfield. Biobanks and blanket consent: the proper place of the public good and public 
perception rationales. Kings Law J 2007; 18: 209-226, p.223.  A similar connection between 
autonomy and control can be found in M.A. Rothstein, B.M Knoppers, & H.L. Harrell. Comparative 
approaches to biobanks and privacy. J Law Med Ethics 2016; 44: 161-172, where they suggest:  
‘Autonomy, meaning self-governance or self-determination, is an important principle that informs 
the special interests of individuals in controlling the access to and use of personal data and biological 
specimens’ p. 162 
11 T. Caulfield, Timothy & B. Murdoch. Genes, cells, and biobanks: Yes, there’s still a consent 
problem. PLoS Biol 2017; 15: e2002654, p.3. 
 
 
It might be objected at this point that this claim, about a right to control, is not widely endorsed.  
However, it may be that many of those opposed to broad consent would concur with Caulfield et al. 
but, armed with what is taken to be a sufficient reason to reject broad consent—that it fails to be 
informed consent—there is little need to unpack further reasons why broad consent is morally 
inadequate.  The argument is worth focusing on more closely because, if it really is the case that 
participants have a moral right to exercise ongoing control over the use of their research samples, 
and broad consent fails to respect that kind of right then this would strengthen the case against 
broad consent, whether or not such a line of objection has yet been widely articulated.  Indeed, the 
right to control objection would be a powerful move against broad consent.  The objection identifies 
a moral deficiency in broad consent whether it is interpretable as informed consent or not.  That is, 
even those who hold that broad consent is informed consent will have to address the objection that 
their favoured consent framework fails to properly respect an important moral right.  
In order to assess the right to control objection we need to be clear about what control is, and what 
a right to control is, in the context of biobank participation.  It will be argued here that we do have a 
fundamental moral right to control access to, and the use of, bodily samples and personal data.  It 
will then be shown, perhaps surprisingly, that broad consent frameworks do not conflict with, 
breach, or disrespect such rights. 
 
2.  WHAT IS A RIGHT TO CONTROL? 
 
To talk of control is to talk of the influence that our decisions and actions have.  If A controls her 
model aircraft remotely, what we mean is that, her choices effect what the aircraft does.  Control is 
to do with the efficacy of our choices.  Our concern is with control over what other people do (with 
samples and personal data).  If one party B controls what A does, B’s choices about what A does 
bring it about, in some way, that A does those things. For example, consider the employer-employee 
relation.  An employer (or a manager in a chain of command) can determine what her employees (or 
subordinates) do simply by telling them to do so.12  This kind of control is not absolute (what the 
employer can command is limited), but so long as the relationship is maintained—and within the 
terms of the employment contract—the employer can determine what tasks the employee does, at 
what time, at what location, and so on.   
It is important to note how this kind of control is exercised.  The employer does not physically 
control the employee, nor does she make threats.  The employer (or manager) has a distinctive kind 
                                                          
12 In certain states in the US the employer-employee relationship is explicitly defined in terms of the 
(legal) right of the employer to control what the employee does.  See C.W. Summers. Employment at 
will in the United States: The divine right of employers. U. Pa. J. Lab. & Emp. L. 2000; 3: 65. 
 
 
of power, a normative power: the power to change the (local) normative situation in specific ways 
by one’s speech acts.  The employer has the power to impose certain (limited) obligations on the 
employee.  If the employer says “work on the Smith account this week, not Jones” the employee 
ought to do so, and ought to do so because the employer has said so.13 
A biobank participant does not have the power to command or order the biobank to do what she 
wishes.  She cannot, for example, insist that the biobank only use her samples for research into a 
condition that interests her.  The biobank is not working for the participant.  The biobank is working 
in the service of other goals (for many other people).  The biobank seeks to acquire, access and use 
human subjects’ bodily material and information derived from it for these purposes.  However, 
where others seek to access and use “items” that we have rights over, then we, as right-holders, 
have a distinctive way of controlling what others do with those “items”.   
A non-biobank example will help us here.  Suppose B owns a camera.  Her property right is a 
complex of different elements.  For our purposes the two elements that matter are, first, that her 
property right involves a negative claim right against others touching, taking, using, destroying, her 
camera.  Second, her property right involves a positive power to create exceptions to the claim right.  
She can permit certain parties to touch, take, use her camera.  This power is discretionary.  It is up to 
the right holder whether to permit anyone, it is up to her whom to permit, and for what purpose, at 
what time, what duration, what location and so on.  She can bring these normative changes about 
simply by her saying so.   
Property rights underpin a distinctive way of exercising control.  The right holder’s choices 
determine (within a limited domain) which actions (but not others) performed in certain ways (but 
not others) are permissible for certain agents (but not others).  The right holder has the discretion to 
shape this region of the normative landscape (the region over which she is a small-scale sovereign) 
as she sees fit.  This includes restricting the agents who may use her “item”, the contexts in which 
they may use it, the purposes for which they may use it, the duration and manner of use.  This kind 
of power is not the same as the power to command.  If nobody wants to use B’s camera, and if 
nobody uses B’s camera, then her power to permit will make little difference to anyone else’s 
reasons for acting. Suppose B says “Take the camera but don’t use it in the rain.”  If A takes the 
camera, B’s choices have determined what A may do (that is, what she is permitted to do).  Here B 
controls what A does with the camera in a recessive way, by removing prohibitions and specifying 
the scope, conditions and terms of use that are permissible.  Rather than introducing or imposing an 
                                                          
13 The employer gives reasons to the employee in a “robust” way.  See D. Enoch. Authority and 
Reason‐Giving. Philos Phenomenol Res 2014; 89: 296-332. 
 
 
obligation that A did not have, B shapes A’s use of the camera by her selective shaping of what is 
permissible for B to do (with her camera).   
3. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, AND THE RIGHT TO CONTROL 
What about the right to control biobank samples and personal data?  In our example above, the 
right to control is grounded in the property rights that B has over her camera.  One option here 
would be to argue that participants have a right to control the use of their samples and data because 
they have relevant property rights over their samples.  But this would leave the right oto control 
objection against broad consent framework relatively weak.   
First, it is not clear that the notion of property rights is readily applicable to the governance of 
personal data (our interests in privacy are distinct from the kinds of interest that ground physical 
property rights and intellectual property rights).  Second, there is considerable debate over whether 
the notion of property rights is applicable to bodily material (such as blood samples, tissue, or 
genetic material).14  Third, property rights are, arguably, legal rights than a fundamental moral right. 
If any of these three concerns have weight, this would undermine the force of the right to control” 
objection as we have outlined it so far.  But, for our purposes, we can remain agnostic about the 
applicability of property rights to biobank samples and data. The “right to control” objection against 
broad consent can be framed in terms of other less contentious rights that the participant has over 
her samples and personal data.  
The reason why property rights give rise to a right to control is not because they are property rights 
per se but because property rights are rights of a certain form.  They are rights that give a distinctive 
significance to the rightholder’s choices.  There are other rights of this form including information 
privacy rights and rights over the body.  In each case there are claim rights that specify a zone of 
"exclusion" from others by giving others reasons to refrain from touching, using, inquiring, disclosing 
and so on.  The right holder also has the discretionary power to create exceptions to her rights for 
whomever she chooses.  Whether others act permissibly is up to the right holder.  What others are 
permitted to do, and how, when, and so on, is all, in principle, under the control of the consentor 
herself.   
Thus, one widely endorsed account of the fundamental nature of information privacy rights is 
explicitly framed in terms of a right to control:  "A right to privacy is a right to control access to and 
uses of—places, bodies, and personal information”.15  Fried offers a similar formulation of the state 
of privacy: "Privacy is not simply an absence of information about us in the minds of others, 
                                                          
14 B. Björkman, Barbro & S.O. Hansson. Bodily rights and property rights. J Med Ethics 2006; 32: 
209-214; R.E. Gold. Body parts: Property rights and the ownership of human biological materials. 
Georgetown University Press, 1997. 
15 A. Moore. Defining privacy. J Soc Philos 2008; 39: 411–428,  p. 421. 
 
 
rather it is the control we have over information about ourselves."16  The state of privacy is 
the state of being in control, the right to privacy is the right to control personal information.  
The right to control is not merely a right to control access to personal information, but also 
extends to others’ use of our personal information: we can consent to someone's use of our 
personal data for the purposes of a financial transaction, but not thereby permit them to 
make other uses of it. Where biobanks use non-anonymised personal data then information 
privacy rights are directly relevant.  Indeed, as one recent article on biobank regulation puts it: "The 
core element of privacy is to maintain control over personal information"17   
 In a similar way, rights over the body are also cast in terms of a "right to control".  Debates about 
the ethics of abortion make appeal to a women's right to control her body (as taking precedence 
over an embryo or foetus' "right to life").18  As with our personal information, not only do we have a 
say in who has access to our bodies, we have a say in what people do to us, or with our bodily selves, 
or with our bodily material.  If you consent to a clinician taking blood for (your own) diagnostic 
purposes, the clinician is not thereby permitted to use that blood for, say, a piece of modern art, or 
to sell it online to a group of hematophages.  Her use of the blood is restricted by what you permit 
her to do with it.  Because biobank samples are located within the body, rights over the body are 
directly relevant.  Such rights are not simply rights against access or intrusion.  If something is 
located in B's body, B has a right to introduce a specification of permissible use: "A may only take X 
from my body in order to use it for purposes Y, Z".   
There is much more that we might say about the nature and limits of our rights over the body, and 
about information privacy rights.  For our purposes what matters is that such rights are of a kind that 
give rise to a distinctive right to control.19  In each case there is power to specify (to whatever 
degree of specificity one wishes) exactly what is permissible, for whom, at what time, for what 
                                                          
16 C. Fried. 1984. Privacy. In Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy. E D. Schoeman, ed. New York: 
Cambridge University Press: 203-222.  
17 J. Sándor & P. Bárd. 2011. Anonymity and privacy in biobanking. In Biobanks and Tissue Research.  
C. Lenk, J. Sándor & B. Gordijn, eds.  Dordrecht:  Springer: 213-230. p. 215 
18 For example M.A. Warren. On the moral and legal status of abortion. The Monist 1973; 57: 43-61, 
p.44. 
19 An anonymous reviewer for the journal raises the worry that there may not be anything properly 
characterizable as a “standalone” right of control operative here, over and above, that is, the various 
more familiar and well-grounded rights such as the right to privacy and rights over the body.  In 
response, the argument here is against the idea that there is some kind of “right to control” samples 
and data that provides a moral objection to broad consent.  If there is no right to control at all, then 
the argument is stronger still!  On the other hand, if the right to control reduces to other rights, then 
the arguments offered here can be viewed as showing that the cluster of more fundamental rights 
that we do have, are not sufficient to underpin an obligation on biobanks to offer the kind of control 
cited by Caulfield and others.   
 
 
purposes.  From this point onwards, for the sake of our discussion, it will simply be accepted without 
further question that we do have these fundamental moral rights—especially rights over the body 
and information privacy rights—and that we do have the right to control the use of our biological 
samples and personal information.   
 
4.  THE PROBLEM FOR BROAD CONSENT 
 
At this point it may seem that it we already have our conclusive case against broad consent 
frameworks.  Certain kinds of right, including property rights, rights over the body, and information 
privacy rights, underpin a “right to control” others access to and use of the right-protected “item”.  
This is an ongoing power that she has.  Suppose B says to A “You may use my camera tomorrow”.  
Later in the evening B sees a severe weather warning.  B contacts A saying “Look, don’t use the 
camera in the rain”.  When B gave permission to A to use the camera in certain ways, B did not 
thereby give up her right to control. B has an ongoing right to control of the normative situation and 
it is up to her whether to revise the scope of her permission at a later date.   
In the case of biobank participation, a broad consent framework denies the participant the 
opportunity to exercise this ongoing right to shape the scope of her permission.  First, broad consent 
frameworks do not provide the participant with specific current information about what is being 
done, or is proposed to be done, with the samples and data that she has rights over.  Because she 
does not know what is being done, she cannot shape her permission in line with specific information 
about each project.  Second, even if the participant were to find out what is being done with her 
samples and data by some other route, or if she were to change her mind about may be done, the 
broad consent framework does not allow the participant the option to do this.  It seems that the 
participant has, in effect, abandoned her rights.  Thus, Shickle referring to "blanket" consent, but a 
similar point might be made for broad consent: 
Blanket consent does not permit subjects to act meaningfully on their continuing interest in their 
health information. The data and DNA is being treated as though it has been abandoned by its 
owner. Like a child that has been adopted, the ‘natural parents’ give up rights to control its future to 
biobanks as the adoptive parents.20 
 
A defender of the broad consent framework might respond that the biobank participant does not 
completely abandon her rights: the participant retains her right to revoke her permission.  
                                                          
20 D. Shickle, The consent problem within DNA biobanks. Studies in History and Philosophy of 
Biological and Biomedical Research, 2006; 37: 503–519, p. 510. 
 
 
But a right to revoke is not the same thing as a right to control, at least if we consider the contrast 
between a right to withdraw her sample from all (future) studies, and the kind of fine-tuned control 
suggested by Caulfield.  The right to revoke is, in effect, a single act that brings a certain kind of 
relationship to an end, and with it, changes the normative situation in a “final” way.  The right is 
exercised “blindly” or, at least, not on the basis of a continuing flow of specific information offered 
by the biobank as a way of securing specific informed consent on a case-by-case basis.  In contrast, 
the right to control under consideration here is a right to continue to exercise specific control over 
the use of one’s samples on the basis of specific, relevant, information about different uses and 
users of those samples and data.   
It is true that a case-by-case, fully informed, right to revoke, would constitute the kind of right to 
control under discussion here, but such a right is very unlike the “generic” right to withdraw that is 
part of broad consent frameworks. Indeed, if such a case-by-case model were in place, it would be 
hard to view it as a broad consent framework at all (insofar as the biobank would be under the same 
kinds of obligations to disclose specific information, on a case-by-case basis, that we find under 
specific consent frameworks.  A coherent broad consent model is one where the right to withdraw is 
not offered on a case-by-case basis, and from here on we shall focus on whether this kind of broad 
consent framework—with a “generic” right to withdraw—is morally problematic insofar as it fails to 
respect, or accommodate, the (putative) right to control one’s samples and data. 
The key point for our purposes is that a broad consent framework fails to put the participant in a 
position where she can continue to exercise control in a specific way.  We thus seem to have clarified 
and given a strong defence to the worry expressed earlier that that broad consent frameworks ‘do 
not allow patients to act meaningfully on their continuing right to control their health information’ 
(emphasis added).21  Project-specific consent frameworks, by way of contrast, do respect the 
participants’ continuing right to exercise control by allowing them the opportunity to choose what is 
permissible, and for whom, on a case-by-case basis.   
The remainder of this discussion will accept three conclusions of our discussion so far.  First, biobank 
participants do have fundamental moral rights over access to and use of their samples and personal 
information.  Second, such rights underpin a distinctive right to control access to and use of samples 
and data.  Third, project-specific consent offers participants a greater kind and degree of control 
than broad consent.   
 It will be argued, however, that it does not follow from these three claims that there is some kind of 
moral failing in offering a broad consent framework in contrast to a project-specific consent 
                                                          
21 Caulfield, Upshur & Daar, op. cit. p. 4,  
 
 
framework.  In order to see why, we need to be expand upon the social dimension of seeking and 
giving permission against a backdrop of such rights.   
 
5.  GIVING PERMISSION WITHOUT ONGOING CONTROL 
 
We have been focusing on creative side of shaping what is permissible, how a rightholder can choose 
what is permissible, for whom, when, in what manner, and so on. However, in many social contexts, 
there are good reasons why permission is freely given without the rightholder being able to 
effectively revoke permission, or revise the scope of her permission.22  For example, suppose A has 
taken the camera for the weekend on a hiking trip and is “out of reach”.  B may change her mind 
about what is permissible, but she cannot communicate that change of mind to A.  At this point we 
run into a debate about whether one can change the normative situation simply by a mental act.  
Some legal philosophers hold a ”mentalist”  theory of permissive consent.23 On this view, whether or 
not B wrongs A depends upon what A has in mind, not what A has communicated.  As soon as her 
mind changes, A wrongs B by using the lens in the rain, albeit unwittingly and blamelessly.  In 
contrast, a performative account of giving permission, holds that A cannot change the normative 
situation without performing an appropriate communicative act.  For our current purposes we can 
sidestep this debate.  This is because our focus here is upon the way that the rightholder can 
exercise control over what other people do via her power to shape what is permissible for them to 
do.  Clearly, simply changing one’s mind without telling anyone, is not apt to make a practical 
difference to others.  We cannot control what others do in any real sense without communicating 
our choices to them.   
In many social contexts, the rightholder knows up front that she will be unable to effectively revise 
or revoke her permission once it is given, simply because it will not be feasible to get in touch with 
the permitted party for at least some of the time after permission is given and the “item” is taken or 
“in use”.  In such situations, when the rightholder is deliberating about whether to give permission, 
she has to take into account the fact that there will be periods when she is “offline” in terms of 
exercising control.  If she prefers to remain in control, she need not give permission.  However, if the 
rightholder freely chooses to give permission, knowing that she will be unable to effectively revoke 
or revise such permission, this is not some kind of moral failure, nor is it a deficient normative 
transaction.  Indeed, it would be very odd to deny any of us the liberty to exercise our power to 
permit in this way, if we see fit.  Suppose B is happy to lend A the camera for the weekend, even 
                                                          
22 From this point on, our focus will be on the right to revise, rather than revoke permission, for 
broad consent frameworks allow the former but deny the latter. 
23 L. Alexander, Larry. The ontology of consent. Analytic Philosophy 2014; 55: 102-113. 
 
 
though A will be out of reach.  We cannot argue that A ought not to take the camera on those terms, 
nor that B should be prohibited from permitting in this way if she wishes.  
Although epistemic limitations provide one reason why someone might give permission knowing 
that they will be unable to effectively revise or revoke it, such limitations are not the only reason.  
Another reason for giving permission of this kind is simply because it of value of the parties to the 
transaction, that both parties agree “up front” that permission will be “fixed”.  One kind of everyday 
context where this is the case is where A seeks permission from B to use something X in order to 
achieve some goal Y, and where it is important for meeting the goal Y that B not revoke or revise her 
permission (or, at least, that she not have absolute discretion in how she revises it).  Suppose A asks 
B if she may borrow her car to visit a sick relative on Sunday.  Suppose A makes it clear to B that if B 
permits her to use the car, she will make plans accordingly, and she will not seek other means of 
transport “Look, I need to know if I can rely on this”.  A’s plans are now dependent upon B remaining 
steadfast in her permission.  In lending A the car, B undertakes a commitment not to revoke or 
revise her permission in any way that would block A achieving her goal.  B might later revise her 
permission in some ways “Sorry, I forgot to mention, you’ll need to add some oil” but ought not to 
change it in other ways that “block” A achieving her goal.   
In this kind of everyday situation, B voluntarily undertakes to restrict her future options.  She 
commits to not exercise control, or, at the very least, commits to certain limitations on the kind of 
control that she will exercise.  There is nothing odd about this, or anything morally wrong with this.  
We find this kind of restriction of our own options in making promises (and other commitments and 
vows).  Some promises are “positive”, involving a binding undertaking to do something, others are 
negative, involving an undertaking to refrain (“I promise not to bother you with more questions”).  
Many kinds of contract—formal or informal—depend upon this kind of commitment to abide by 
(and not revoke or revise) the initial terms, as freely agreed at the start.  It does not wrong the 
rightholder to ask her if she wishes to agree to restrict her options in this way. 
Not all requests are morally innocent. Consider requests for sex from a teacher to pupil, or judge to 
witness on a current trial, or from a clinician to current patient.  Because there are moral 
prohibitions on sexual contact between people who stand in those relationships, there is a derivative 
prohibition on asking.  If it is wrong to ask B for permission to do X, then it is wrong to ask B to 
commit to fixing her permission to do X.   
But nobody is claiming that biobanks should not make any requests for participation.  The “right to 
control“ objection is that it is wrong for biobanks to make their requests in such a way that the 
permission is fixed “up front” without further opportunity to revise, and without the establishment 
of channels of communication that would give the participant ongoing, and updated, information 
 
 
that would be relevant to deciding whether to permit this or that use of her sample or data.  The 
objection is that it is somehow wrong to ask the participant to undertake to refrain from exercising 
her right to control.  But we have seen that there is nothing wrong per se with doing so.  We also 
noted that epistemic and communicative considerations are relevant here.  Suppose A wants to take 
B’s camera on a yachting trip across the Atlantic.  It is possible for A to get in touch B, but expensive 
via a satellite phone.  The costs of communication give A reasons to ask B for “steadfast” permission.  
If B does not like this, she need not give permission.   
If there is nothing intrinsically wrong with requesting “fixed” permission, there may still be reasons 
why it is wrong for a biobank to request permission in the “fixed” way that broad consent entails.  
Let us consider some examples. 
 
6.  BIOBANK REQUESTS: ARE THERE SPECICAL OBLIGATIONS TO OFFER CONTROL?  
 
We might object that broad consent participation requests are wrong precisely because they do not 
allow the participant the opportunity to exercise her ongoing right to control”.  Here we need to 
remind ourselves of the difference between, first, a denial of the opportunity to exercise the right to 
control because no permission is sought or given and, on the other hand, a self-imposed 
commitment not to exercise the right of control.  In terms of the former, Greely notes the 
implications of simply using already-acquired samples without any permission at all.   
Abandoning the consent requirement, however, would [ . . .] violate the subject's dignitary interest in 
controlling her medical records or tissues. One can imagine an unconsenting subject of such research 
exploding with "It's my blood, damn it. How can they use it without my permission?" (emphasis 
added)24 
There is a great deal of difference between denying someone the opportunity to exercise their right 
at all, and asking someone to freely undertake to restrict their exercise of that right.  Broad consent 
involves the latter kind of restriction, not the former.   
One thought that we might have at this point is that biobank recruitment involves more exacting and 
demanding standards for gaining permission, at least in comparison to our everyday social 
transactions (like borrowing a friend’s camera) noted above.  There is nothing analogous to informed 
consent requirements for borrowing a friend’s camera.  A medical researcher, bound by obligations 
to gain informed consent, does not have the discretion to propose research in whatever manner she 
chooses (e.g, by simply saying “Do you want to take part in this research?”).  Medical research 
                                                          
24 T. H. Greely. Breaking the stalemate: a prospective regulatory framework for unforseen research 
uses of human tissue samples and health information. Wake Forest L. Rev 1999; 34: 737-766, p. 758. 
 
 
recruitment requires informed consent, which, in turn, places on obligations on the researcher as to 
how she makes her request.   
 
But there are two problems with this line of thought, if it is meant to pose an objection to broad 
consent.  The first point is that an informed consent paradigm is not about giving the participant the 
opportunity to shape the scope of her permission, or introduce terms and conditions on her 
permission.  Informed consent differs from everyday consent in that it requires the communication 
of certain kinds of information “up front”, in order that the addressee may make a “fully informed” 
binary decision, a decision whether to consent, or not, but this is not to give the addressee the 
discretion to shape her permission in any way she sees fit.  For example, suppose the proposed 
research involves taking four blood samples in total, over a period of four weeks.  Suppose the 
participant only wants the researcher to take two blood samples in total.  The fact that she would 
prefer to permit that, rather than the actions proposed, does not oblige the researcher to offer to do 
so, nor even to offer her the opportunity to revise the scope of what she is being asked to permit.  
Similarly, the participant is not offered the opportunity to freely introduce conditions on her 
permission: “OK,  you can take the blood, but only if you buy me a laptop”.  Or, rather, she can “say” 
these things, but not as any effective part of the consent transaction.  To put it bluntly, all informed 
consent involves a limitation on the addressee’s “right to control” by offering the addressee a binary 
choice, albeit one enable by a full explicit disclosure of relevant information.   
But offering an informed binary choice, rather than engaging in a person-by-person individual 
“negotiation” of the scope of permission, is entirely legitimate.  Indeed, there are at least four good 
reasons why researchers make “fixed” binary informed consent requests.  First, the proposed 
research is set up with research goals in mind (finding something out, or testing a hypothesis) which, 
in turn, shapes the actions that the research will involve.  The fact that a participant might want to 
do something different, something that changes the nature of the research, is problematic (or may 
render the research impossible).  This feeds into a second point.  The researcher will typically not 
need a particular individual (there may be some exceptions with very rare medical conditions), if one 
person will not participate on the terms proposed, another is likely to do so.  There is thus no 
incentive to allow any particular addressee the opportunity to shape permission as she would wish.  
Third, in terms of the administrative and bureaucratic side of the recruitment process, it will typically 
be expedient to have a form of recruitment that is applicable to many (and if people do not like it, 
they need not participate).  Here rough principles of justice may come into play.  To allow one 
participant the opportunity to exercise control over what is permissible, or the terms of permission, 
whilst denying that opportunity to others, is unfair.  The informed consent process itself is subject to 
 
 
prior formal assessment by review bodies which, in turn, places limits on the discretion that the 
researcher has to engage in anything like individual bargaining or negotiation about the scope and 
terms of permission.  When the ethics committee evaluates the research proposal and its informed 
consent mechanisms, the assumption is that each participant will be offered the same proposal, not 
that some will “barter” or “bargain” a better “deal”.   
Note too that in non-biobank research, it would be unusual for the participant to be offered the 
opportunity to revise the scope of her permission at a later date.  Participants will have the right to 
withdraw, but not to shape her permission (or introduce conditions upon it) in any way that she sees 
fit.  Suppose our participant above decides after three weeks that “three blood samples is enough”.  
She is not given the option of continuing to participate but controlling what is permissible, her only 
option is to withdraw (or to continue on the terms agreed).  This kind of “fixed” recruitment does 
not infringe upon, or disrespect the participants liberty or her “right to control” what happens to 
her, or what is done to her.  It offers the participant a proposed way of exercising those rights and 
she is under no obligation to assent to such an offer, if it is not in line with her preferences.  If she 
does choose to consent, then she chooses to consent on those terms.  Once again, this is an exercise 
of her discretion, not some kind of infringement of it.   
So it cannot be the mere fact that biobank participation requires informed consent that implies that 
it is wrong for the biobank not to give the participant an effective say in what she would like to 
permit or the conditions she would like to place on that permission.  If it is wrong for the biobank, it 
is wrong for all medical research (and, indeed, wrong for all and every request for permission from 
institutions where the request is of a binary “accept” or “refuse” form, without the option to 
exercise one’s discretion in “sculpting” what is permissible).   
But now it may be objected that biobank consent is different from other kinds of medical research in 
that biobank participation is for long term, open-ended, research by many different researchers for 
many different specific purposes.  Whilst this may be true, it does not directly provide a case against 
broad consent per se.  We saw above that non-biobank research recruitment, fails to offer the 
participant a say in setting the terms of permission, so why should the long term or ongoing nature 
of the biobank case make any difference? 
It might be argued at this point that there is a difference in that, in the biobank case, unlike non-
biobank medical research, we have more than one candidate framework for managing the ongoing 
relationship between the biobank and the participant with regard to the use of her sample and 
personal data.  If we then fix upon the contrast between project-specific consent and broad consent, 
the former affords the participant no ongoing control, whilst the project-specific option does.  We 
might then argue that if there are these two options, then the biobank is obliged to offer the better 
 
 
one.  Surely offering more control is better than offering less.  But this line of argument is weak.  
Once we start drawing a contrast between broad consent and other candidate frameworks, with an 
eye to satisfying participants preferences, then why stop at project-specific consent.  Many 
participants, I assume, would prefer to have their participation secured by a large financial “gift”, or 
the offer of a new laptop.  But the fact that participants would prefer this does not imply that they 
are being wronged in any way by not being offered such a thing, nor does it follow that simply 
because such a framework is possible, and would be preferred to some other framework, that the 
biobank is thereby under any obligation to offer it.   
It might be argued, in response, that the offer of a laptop is clearly supererogatory: a good or benefit 
is provided but there is no obligation to provide it.  In contrast, the “right to control” objection is 
about the rights that the participant has.  But this line of response is problematic.  We have seen 
that a “fixed” proposal that does not allow the option of revision does not infringe those rights, it 
offers an opportunity to exercise those rights, in a specified way, but with no obligation to do so.  
The objector cannot reply that there is something morally suspect about this kind of self-restriction 
in general.  Promises, and other kinds of voluntary undertaking of obligations, involve this kind of 
self-restriction too.   
A final line of response might run like this: the biobank researcher is obliged to secure participation 
via a properly informed consent, and only project-specific consent constitutes properly informed 
consent.  This line of objection problematic first, because project-specific consent also places limits 
on the “right to control” as noted above.  Second, it also undercuts the force of the “right to control” 
objection as an independent and substantive line of objection.  We noted the “impasse” in the 
biobank consent debate where there is deep disagreement about whether broad consent “counts 
as” properly informed consent.  The seeming advantage of the “right to control” objection is that 
made appeal to some morally salient feature, one where broad consent seems to differ from 
project-specific consent in a clear way.  If broad consent does count as informed consent, the worry 
about the right to control would still be in play.  To fall back on the “broad consent is not properly 
informed consent” objection, is to return us to the impasse that we started with. 
It might be argued that both project-specific consent and broad consent are wrong, and that a full 
respect for the “right to control” implies a radically discretionary, radically individual, case-by-case, 
form of request-permission transaction, where each individual is given as detailed a “say” as she 
chooses in how to shape her permission.25  If the lines of argument above are correct, they apply 
                                                          
25 It should be noted that at some point, all consent frameworks, including “flexible” ones like 
dynamic consent (J. Kaye, et al. Dynamic consent: a patient interface for twenty-first century 
research networks. Eur J Hum Genet 2015; 23: 141-146) and “meta-consent” (T. Ploug & S. Holm. 
Meta Consent–A Flexible Solution to the Problem of Secondary Use of Health Data. Bioethics 2016; 
 
 
equally here: there is nothing wrong with asking people to undertake to restrict their liberty, nothing 
wrong with not offering people full discretion in shaping what is proposed, but merely offering them 
a binary choice.   
 
7.  BROAD CONSENT VS DYNAMIC CONSENT: KEEPING TRACK OF DIFFERENT REASONS FOR 
COMMUNICATING WITH PARTICIPANTS26 
 
Our discussion has primarily focused upon whether a putative right to control might be part of a 
decisive argument in favour of one kind of consent framework for biobanks (specific re-consent) 
rather than a one-off broad consent.  The former seemed to accommodate and respect the right to 
control whilst the latter does not.  But there may be good reasons why biobanks ought to disclose 
information about the research that they enable that are not grounded in an obligation to secure 
specific informed consent for each use.  Making information available to participants, and to the 
public more generally, may be an important part of securing a “social license” for biobank research.  
Making information available in this way may increase trust in the biobanks (and in scientific 
research more generally) by creating an environment where biobanks are viewed as being 
transparent.  Such transparency and social license may improve recruitment (if people feel properly 
engaged with, and trusting of, the biobank and its activities).   
Recent developments in information technology not only make it possible for biobanks to make 
information readily, and speedily, available to mass audiences (e.g. by a website, RSS or twitter 
feed), it is also possible to allow different people to tailor the information that is made available to 
them.  So called “dynamic consent” frameworks involve this kind of individually tailored information 
platform. .27  A wide range of continuous, interactive, personalized, channels of communication is 
offered between researchers and data subjects.  It might seem that dynamic consent has to be a 
variant upon specific re-consent, but this is not the case.  It is entirely coherent that a broad consent 
framework might also be one that makes information about biobank activities available (to 
participants and other parties) and it might even do so in an individually tailored way.  But, if there 
are good reasons for biobanks to develop this rich kind of communicative framework, is it not the 
case that broad consent and specific consent are likely to end up being pretty much the same in 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
30: 721-732.)  involve fixed elements. Not everything is up for negotiation, nor should it be.  So there 
is no categorical distinction between broad consent and these other forms of consent, only a matter 
of degree. 
26 The discussion in this section is in response to, and aided by, some helpful and insightful 
comments and suggestions by two (anonymous) referees for this journal. 
27 Kaye et al., op cit.  Also , J. Kaye. From single biobanks to international networks: developing e-
governance. Human genetics 2011; 130: 377.  
 
 
practice, and, in terms of our discussion here, if this does happen, would that mean that new 
technologies will simply lead to participants having the kind of right to control suggested by Caulfield 
and others. 
There are two points to make here.  First, although a broad consent framework might in fact make 
available information to participants, insofar as it is broad consent framework the reasons why it 
does so (and why it is obliged to do so) are not by way of achieving some kind of specific, case-by-
case consent.  Suppose a jurisdiction decides that biobanks ought to make information available to 
others but for reasons not directly to do gaining specific informed consent.  If it really is a broad 
consent framework, then it is permissible for the biobank to use samples and data without requiring 
specific authorisation for new uses or users.  Although information is being made available, the 
normative role played by such communicative acts, and the normative significance of the responses 
(or lack of responses) to such acts, is not the same as it is in specific informed consent frameworks.   
The second point concerns the right to control and draws upon the observation discussed earlier, 
that a right to withdraw ones permission does imply an attenuated right of control (but not a right to 
continue to exercise control in a positive way on a case by case basis.  It is true that greater 
information disclosure, including information that might be tailored to individual participants would 
put participants into a better position, in terms of the information that they have, for them to make 
a decision whether to revoke their consent.  But if the framework is a broad consent one, then the 
right to revoke is a generic, broad, one, not a right to revoke consent on a case-by-case basis.  As 
such the participant does not have a right to control her samples or data in a case-by-case way.  
In sum, the fact that there may be good reasons for keeping participants informed, does not imply a 
rejection of a broad consent framework, nor does it imply a collapse of broad consent into dynamic 
consent if broad consent were to be accompanied by such information flows.  If we are to be clear 
about the place and limits of the putative right to control under discussion here, we need to be 
careful in our moral bookkeeping, as it were, to keep track of the reasons why information is, and 
ought to be, communicated.   
 
8.  CONCLUSION 
 
We began our discussion by accepting that we do have a right to control access to and use of our 
own bodily material and personal data and, after some clarification, showed how such a right is 
grounded in more fundamental rights.  Where we have claim rights against others doing things to or 
with our right-protected “items” coupled with the discretionary power to create whatever kind of 
 
 
exception we wish, for whomever we wish, our choices have a significance for what others do, by 
shaping what is permissible for them to do.   
But there is nothing wrong per se with making requests for permission that do not allow the 
participant to continue to exercise full discretionary control, either because such control will not be 
feasible, or because the exercise of such control is not valuable or desirable (for one or other of the 
parties, or both).  There is nothing wrong with a person freely undertaking to restrict her own 
liberty, contract and promise both involve this, and both are of considerable moral value, not 
morally wrong.   
Our discussion has steered away from the “is broad consent informed consent?” debate, so nothing 
we have said here solves that debate.  More generally, it should be stressed that the discussion here 
does not imply that biobanks should adopt a broad consent framework, in contrast to a project-
specific one.  All that we have aimed to show is that doing so does not wrong the participant by 
failing to respect her “right to control”.   
There are other considerations that may favour project-specific consent.  Some participants may 
prefer to have the kind of case-by-case control that is provided by project-specific consent 
frameworks. If such preferences are widespread and strong enough to lead to mass refusal to 
participate on such terms, it may be better for the biobank to offer the consent framework that 
helps secure participation. But prudential considerations like these can be weighed up against other 
considerations (such as cost, feasibility, risks of self-selecting bias and so on); rights by way of 
contrast are meant to be “trumps”, considerations that aren’t readily balanced against non-
normative considerations like cost.  Nothing said here tells us anything about whether, in the end, 
the cost-benefit ratio of a project-specific framework is more favourable than that of broad consent 
(though, it should be noted, the point just made about refraining from participating because one 
does not like the consent framework applies to project-specific consent too). There may be indirect 
moral considerations too.  As noted above, project-specific consent may help to promote other 
social goods, such as a sense of participation and involvement in current research.  Such involvement 
may have other social benefits in terms of promoting trust in, and a favourable attitude towards, 
new kinds of medical research that might be viewed with suspicion.  But, as we also noted, such 
goods and benefits may be achieved on a broad consent framework too.   
The key point argued for here is that there is no reason to reject broad consent because such a 
framework for recruitment and participation infringes, or fails to adequately respect, the 
participants’ “right to control”.  The “right to control” objection thus does not provide some 
“solution” to the impasse in the biobank consent debate.  What the “solution” is to that impasse, 
must remain a matter for another occasion (or, more likely, a large set of occasions).   
